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The Re-Establishment of the Orange Dynasty in the Netherlands, 
March-November 18131
mark edward hay
On 15 March 1813, Tsar Alexander i, in pursuit of the retreating Grande Armée, passed 
through the Prussian city of Breslau. The Prince of Orange, William vi, who was 
residing in exile on his private estates nearby, seized the opportunity to meet the 
Tsar to request his assistance in retaking the Netherlands for the House of Orange. 
The Tsar was quick to pledge his support, and he accepted Orange into the anti-
Napoleonic coalition that would defeat Napoleon in 1814.2 This anecdote raises 
several questions about the return of the House of Orange to the Netherlands. 
How could a stateless, destitute, and exiled dynasty convince the Tsar to support 
its plans for a return to the Netherlands? Why did the other great powers follow 
suit? And why was the Prince of Orange in London at the outbreak of the uprising 
in the Netherlands in 1813, rather than with the allied armies in Central Europe? The 
aim of this article is to explore how the House of Orange navigated the tumultuous 
diplomatic environment in March through November 1813 to re-establish itself as 
the ruling dynasty of the Netherlands.
Op 15 maart 1813 arriveerde Tsaar Alexander i in de Pruisische stad Breslau, tijdens 
de achtervolging van de zich terugtrekkende Grande Armée. Willem vi, Prins van 
Oranje, die zich op dat moment als banneling op zijn privé-landgoed in de buurt 
van Breslau bevond, haastte zich een ontmoeting te regelen met de tsaar teneinde 
hem om ondersteuning te vragen bij zijn pogingen om Nederland terug te winnen 
voor de Oranjes. De tsaar zegde zijn steun onmiddellijk toe en nam Oranje op in 
de coalitie die Napoleon in 1814 zou verslaan. Deze anekdote werpt verschillende
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vragen op over de terugkeer van het Huis van Oranje naar Nederland. Hoe was 
het mogelijk dat een staatloze, onvermogende, in exil levende dynastie de Tsaar 
zover kon krijgen dat hij haar plannen voor een terugkeer naar Nederland steunde? 
Waarom volgden de andere grootmachten zijn voorbeeld? En waarom bevond de 
Prins van Oranje zich in 1813, aan het begin van de opstand, in Londen, in plaats van 
bij de geallieerde strijdkrachten in Midden-Europa? In dit artikel wordt nagegaan 
hoe het Huis van Oranje zich tussen maart en december 1813 door de tumultueuze 
diplomatieke betrekkingen laveerde en zich opnieuw als het regerende vorstenhuis 
van Nederland installeerde.
Introduction
In the Dutch historiography, the return of the House of Orange is often 
presented as a logical outcome of the uprising in the Netherlands. In 
November 1813, a triumvirate of Dutch notables – Gijsbert Karel van 
Hogendorp, Leopold van Limburg Stirum and Frans Adam van der Duyn van 
Maasdam – seized on the crumbling of Napoleonic rule in the Netherlands 
to proclaim a new Dutch government in The Hague, before appealing to 
their countrymen to join the regime. The political elite of Amsterdam, most 
prominent amongst whom were Joan Melchior Kemper, Anton Reinhard 
Falck, Samuel Wiselius, and Johan Valckenaer, initially resisted the call to 
submit to the triumvirate’s direction of the revolution, fearing a return to the 
politics of before 1795. However, sensing that Amsterdam popular opinion 
was shifting in favour of the direction set out by the triumvirate, thus raising 
the spectre of the Amsterdam elite being marginalised in establishing the 
new regime, they abandoned their resistance. In a few places across the 
Netherlands the Napoleonic regime held out, but thereafter by and large 
the cities and municipalities of the Netherlands were brought into the fold. 
With momentum on their side, the provisional Dutch regime dispatched a 
mission to the Prince of Orange to offer him the ill-defined title of Sovereign 
Prince of the Netherlands. The Prince of Orange accepted. He arrived in the 
Netherlands on 30 November 1813, marking the return of the House of 
Orange to the Netherlands.3 This portrayal is not incorrect, but it is one-sided. 
1 I would like to thank Dr. Matthijs Lok for 
reflecting on a first draft of this paper, and the 
two anonymous reviewers for their scrupulous 
assessment. It has become the better article for it.
2 ‘Prince of Orange to Hardenberg, 19 March 1813’, 
in: H.T. Colenbrander (ed.), Gedenkstukken der 
Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 
tot 1840, 10 vols. (The Hague 1905-1922) vi: 1864; 
‘Prince of Orange to Wilhelmina, 19 March 1813’, 
in: J.W.A. Naber (ed.), Correspondentie van de 
Stadhouderlijke Familie, 1777-1820, 5 vols. (The 
Hague 1931-1936) v: 198-199.
3 I. de Haan. ‘Een Nieuwe Staat’, in: I. de Haan,  
P. den Hoed and H. te Velde (eds.), Een nieuwe 
staat: Het begin van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 
(Amsterdam 2013) 12-17; W. Uitterhoeve, 
1813–Haagse bluf: De korte chaos van vrijwording 
(Nijmegen 2013); J. Koch, Koning Willem i, 
ru
ssia, britain
 an
d
 th
e h
o
u
se o
f o
ran
g
e
5
hay
It views the restoration of the House of Orange from the perspective of the 
geopolitical actor that is the Netherlands, but it ignores the agency of the 
House of Orange. This reflects the tendency in Dutch historiography to 
superimpose the history of the Netherlands onto the history of the House of 
Orange.
Additionally, often in conjunction with the above, the return of the 
Orange dynasty to the Netherlands is attributed to British intervention.4 For 
several reasons this is understandable. For British security, it was crucial that 
the continental North Sea coast remained in the hands of a friendly power that 
was sufficiently robust to ward off incursions. The Southern Low Countries 
were generally dominated by great powers, who, due to the frequency of 
diplomatic reversals in European politics, could not be counted upon to act 
in the interest of Britain. Therefore, Britain relied on the Dutch Republic to 
neutralise any threat.5 In 1795 the Anglo-Dutch security agreement broke 
down, when France conquered the Dutch Republic in a lightening campaign. 
But Britain was quick to develop a Dutch policy, which it pursued with 
vigour. In 1797-1799, Lord Grenville, the British foreign secretary, proposed 
a European concert whereby the Low Countries would be united and placed 
under the House of Orange.6 In August 1799, an Anglo-Russian-Orange 
military force was dispatched to liberate the Netherlands, but the expedition 
failed in its objective.7 In his memorandum of 1805, Prime Minister Pitt the 
Younger likewise called for the restoration of an independent Dutch state, but 
he proposed to annex only Antwerp and its surroundings to this Dutch state, 
with the rest of the Southern Low Countries allocated to Prussia to ensure that 
both states had a stake in containing French ambitions in the Low Countries.8 
In 1809 a second British expedition was landed in the Netherlands with the 
limited aim of securing the strategic port of Antwerp, but this expedition 
1772-1843 (Amsterdam 2013) 224-226; P.J. Blok, 
‘Staatkundige geschiedenis van de omwenteling’, 
in: G.J.W. Koolemans Beijnen (ed.), Historische 
gedenkboek der herstelling van Neêrlands 
onafhankelijkheid in 1813 (Haarlem 1912-1913) 
i: 1-33; H.T. Colenbrander, Inlijving en opstand 
(Amsterdam 1941) 171-318; C.H.E. de Wit, De strijd 
tussen aristocratie en democratie in Nederland, 
1780-1848. Herwaardering van een periode (Heerlen 
1965) 312-336.
4 N.C.F. van Sas, Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot: 
Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831 
(Groningen 1985); E. Lamberts, ‘Het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk als Europese creatie’, in: De Haan, Den 
Hoed and Te Velde (eds.), Een nieuwe staat, 113-
133; Koch, Willem i, 215-224, 228-230; L.A. Struik, 
Oranje in ballingschap 1795-1813: Een Odyssee 
(Amsterdam 2006) 343-365.
5 A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge 1922-1923) i: 54-57.
6 J.M. Sherwig, ‘Lord Grenville’s Plan for a Concert 
of Europe, 1797-1799’, The Journal of Modern 
History 34:3 (Sep. 1962) 291.
7 J. Zuurbier, et al. (eds.), De lange herfst van 
1799: De Russisch-Engelse invasie in polder en duin 
(Castricum 1998); P. Mackesy, Statesmen at War: 
The Strategy of Overthrow, 1789-1799 (London 
1974).
8 C.K. Webster (ed.) British Diplomacy, 1813-1815 
(London 1921) 389-394; Ward and Gooch, British 
Foreign Policy, i: 331-342.
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too failed.9 In addition to British security interests in the Low Countries, the 
relations between the British Royal Family and the House of Orange were 
good due to intermarriage and common dynastic linkages to other protestant 
houses. When the House of Orange was driven from the Netherlands in 
January 1795, it sought exile in Britain. William Frederick George Louis, the 
future King William ii, was given a British upbringing, in part to strengthen 
the British connection. In 1809, he was sent to study at Oxford. After 
graduation in 1811, William joined the British forces in the Peninsula under 
Wellington, where he rose to the rank of Major-General by late 1813. Inquiries 
were also made into the possibility of his marriage to Princess Charlotte, the 
daughter of the Prince of Wales and later King George iv.10 Finally, the idea 
that the return of the House of Orange to the Netherlands is due to British 
intervention is given credence by the fact that the Prince of Orange had been 
in Britain for some months before the outbreak of the Dutch uprising against 
Napoleonic rule, that the Prince of Orange was transported from Britain to 
the Netherlands by the Royal Navy, and that he received British financial and 
material support in his endeavours.11
But caution is needed in seeing Britain’s hand behind the restoration 
of the Orange dynasty. Whilst British security still depended on a friendly 
power in the Netherlands, after several failed attempts at securing British 
interests in the Low Countries, by early 1813 the focus of British foreign policy 
had shifted away from the Low Countries and onto maintaining maritime 
superiority and the military operations in the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, 
by mid-1813 the military successes of the continental allies induced Britain 
to provide diplomatic and financial support for the anti-Napoleonic war 
effort. This served Britain’s broader aims of defeating Napoleonic France, 
but it did mean that Britain’s interests, including those in the Low Countries, 
became entangled with those of the allies. It remained to be seen whether 
British interests in the Low Countries would be accepted by the allies, and at 
what diplomatic cost.12 So, in 1813, the Low Countries were not a priority for 
Britain. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that British interests in 
the Low Countries did not equate to support for a restoration of the House of 
Orange. In 1813 Anglo-Orange relations were not bad, but British opinions 
of some members of the family were better than of others. The opinion of 
the last Stadtholder William v, who had spent much of his exile in Britain, 
9 G.C. Bond, The Grand Expedition: The British 
Invasion of Holland in 1809 (Athens, ga 1979).
10 J. van Zanten, Koning Willem ii, 1792-1849 
(Amsterdam 2013) 59-165; A. Hallema, 
Oranjevorsten in ballingschap: Van Dilleburg en 
Londen uit voor vrijheid en recht (Maastricht 1947) 
180-182, 240-242; J. Rudersdorf, ‘Die Teilnahme 
des Erbprinzen Wilhelm von Oranien-Nassau am 
Spanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1808-1814),’ 
Nassauische Annalen 118 (2007), 392-408.
11 G.J. Renier, Great Britain and the Establishment of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815: A Study 
in British Foreign Policy (The Hague 1930) 66-93, 
120-124.
12 Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, i:  
397-398.
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was generally favourable, as was the opinion of his grandson, William, but 
British opinion was less favourable of the Prince of Orange (at this point: 
Hereditary Prince). To start, the Prince had spent most of his days in exile on 
the continent rather than in Britain, and so he was not well known in British 
circles. More importantly, there were doubts as to the Prince’s suitability as 
future leader of the Netherlands, mainly as the result of his flexible approach 
to politics and his cavalier regard for traditional Orange loyalties. In contrast 
to his father, the Prince of Orange had no qualms about dealing with Britain’s 
archenemy Napoleon in his pursuit of compensation for his losses in the 
Netherlands. And when the decision to deal with Napoleon disappointed, 
the Prince of Orange’s quest for compensation led him to seek Prussian and 
Habsburg support, rather than British support.13
Finally, the idea that, in 1813, Britain readily supported the restoration 
of the House of Orange is not supported by the available evidence. The Prince 
of Orange first attempted to re-establish contact with the British government 
on 20 February 1813, but the overture was ignored by Viscount Castlereagh, 
who had taken over the foreign office in March 1812.14 A second attempt, 
submitted via Hendrik Fagel, the de facto Orange ambassador to the Court of 
St James’s, did elicit a response. The retired Lord Malmesbury, who counselled 
the British government on Dutch affairs, was instructed to update Orange on 
the British position. The note is revealing:
I […] perceive the Prince of Orange still has a hankering to come here [London], 
[which] would be liable to many grave objections, and above all be attended 
with no possible advantage and a great useless expense; he had much better 
turn his whole thoughts to Austria and endeavour thro’ [sic] the means of that 
Court to recover (when the time comes) his German Territories.15
The Prince then tried to force the British government into taking a decision on 
whether to support the House of Orange by traveling to London in person.16 
After this became known in London, Malmesbury restated the British position 
to the Orange ambassador: ‘I really and truly can do nothing: to offer advice 
and counsel is of no use’, and: ‘The sooner he [the Prince of Orange] returns 
the better [...]’, elaborating by pointing out that the Prince of Orange ought to 
be at the frontline at such crucial times.17 But Malmesbury’s discouragement 
was too late. The Prince of Orange had already boarded a ship for Britain.18
13 Renier, Great Britain, 57-58, 65; Koch, Willem i, 219.
14 ‘Prince of Orange to Castlereagh, 20 February 
1813’, Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 1857-1858; 
Naber, Correspondentie, v: 198.
15 ‘Malmesbury to Fagel, 11 March 1813’, 
Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 1860.
16 ‘Prince of Orange to Castlereagh, 9 April 1813’, 
Netherlands, Nationaal Archief [hereafter nl-na], 
2.02.01, 6082.
17 ‘Malmesbury to Fagel, 23 April 1813’, 
Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 1873-1874.
18 ‘Prince of Orange to Wilhelmina, 18 April 1813’, 
Naber, Correspondentie, v: 201.
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
Drawing of the arrival of Prince William Frederick of Orange in 
 Scheveningen, 30 November 1813. Nicolaas Lodewijk Penning (1764 -1818), 
1813 (after Reinier Vinkeles and a drawing of Jan Willem Pieneman). 
 Wikimedia Commons.
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It was only after the Prince of Orange arrived in London on 25 April 
1813 that the House of Orange once again became a consideration in British 
foreign policy. On 27 April 1813, the Prince met with Castlereagh to argue 
his case, but Castlereagh was unwilling to commit Britain to supporting a 
restoration of the House of Orange.19 On 18 May 1813, a second meeting 
followed with the Prince Regent, Castlereagh and Malmesbury. The Prince 
of Orange was informed that Britain was willing to assist in restoring the 
House of Orange to the Netherlands, but that the degree of assistance 
depended on Orange’s desire to renew the friendship with Britain – which 
was interpreted to mean the acceptance of British security interests in the 
Low Countries and Britain’s retaining of some of the Dutch colonies it had 
conquered during the war. Furthermore, British support for an Orange 
restoration was made conditional on consultations with the continental 
allies.20 Whilst awaiting the allies’ response, Castlereagh suggested that 
the Prince of Orange remain in London. There are no clear indications 
that the Prince was held in London against his will, but what is certain, 
is that he would have preferred to return to the continent to participate 
in the military campaign to overthrow Napoleon.21 On several occasions 
the Prince of Orange can be found complaining about having to remain in 
London.22 It was not until 22 November 1813, after the British government 
was informed of the outbreak of the uprising in the Netherlands, that 
the Prince of Orange was allowed to return to the Netherlands. So, whilst 
Britain undeniably played a role in the restoration of the House of Orange, 
the evidence does not support early and enthusiastic backing for an Orange 
restoration.
Reflecting on the historiographical representation of the return of the 
House of Orange to the Netherlands in general, one could conclude that the 
role played by Dutch domestic actors is understood and that the role played 
by Britain is understood – though not British motivations – but that the role 
played by the House of Orange is ignored. The unawareness of the agency of 
arguably the most important actor significantly inhibits a full understanding 
of this crucial episode in the history of the House of Orange, and by extension 
the history of the Netherlands.
19 ‘Minutes of meeting of Prince of Orange and 
Castlereagh, 23 April 1813’, England, National 
Archives [hereafter en-na], fo 37/64; ‘Notes by 
B.P. van Lelyveld 25 April–30 November 1813’, 
Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 1874-1876.
20 ‘Castlereagh to Cathcartt, 20 May 1813’, en-
na, fo 65/83; ‘Minutes by Fagel, 18 May 1813’, 
Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 1881-1882; 
‘Prince of Orange to Wilhelmina, 21 May 1813’, 
ibidem, vi: 1883-1884.
21 ‘Prince of Orange to Wilhelmina, 7 October 1813’, 
Naber, Correspondentie, v: 223-227; Koch, Willem i, 
221.
22 ‘Prince of Orange to Van Suchtelen, 7 October 
1813’, nl-na, 2.02.01, 6211.
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The Ottonian Nassaus
Part of the reason for the lack of understanding of the historical agency 
of the House of Orange is that the dynasty is perceived to be but a small 
family that was marginalised from European affairs after its ouster in 1795. 
Nothing was further from the truth. The key to understanding the historical 
agency of the House of Orange is to view it as a component part of the 
House of Nassau. On the eve of the French Revolution the House of Nassau 
was divided into two branches: the Walramian Nassaus and the Ottonian 
Nassaus. The Walramian Nassaus were subdivided into three branches: 
Nassau-Saarbrücken, Nassau-Weilburg and Nassau-Usingen. The  
Nassau-Saarbrücken branch died out in 1797, and its territory, on the left 
bank of the Rhine, was inherited by Nassau-Usingen, but fell to France 
after the Imperial Recess of 1803. Territorially, Nassau-Weilburg and 
Nassau-Usingen were within the Holy Roman Empire. The territories were 
fragmented and, despite lying between the Rhine, the Main and the Lahn 
rivers, the territories were landlocked. Politically, the Walramian Nassaus were 
loyal to the Reich and the Habsburg Monarchy.23 The territory of the Ottonian 
Nassaus is referred to as Nassau-Dietz, which was an amalgamation of four 
previously separate counties, Dietz, Hadamar, Dillenburg and Siegen. Nassau-
Dietz also lay entirely within the Holy Roman Empire, but in addition to these 
lands, the Ottonian Nassaus possessed extensive territories in the Netherlands, 
and traditionally they were the principal contenders for the stadtholdership.24
The Ottonian Nassaus, of course, are commonly known as the House 
of Orange-Nassau, or simply the House of Orange. Where the political 
loyalties of the Walramian Nassaus lay with the Reich and the Habsburgs, 
Orange had a long tradition of strong ties with Britain and Prussia. In 1780s 
the House of Orange was unseated by Dutch revolutionaries, the Patriots. 
Only Prussian military intervention, a personal request from the Princess 
Consort Wilhelmina to her brother Frederick William ii of Prussia, and British 
political scheming, helped restore the House of Orange. Upon return, the 
Stadtholder set about strengthening his position. In 1788, he concluded a 
treaty with Prussia and Britain, in which Berlin and London were committed 
23 B.C.D. Anderson, Ernst Marschall von Bieberstein 
and the Foundation of Modern Nassau (1770-1814) 
(Ann Arbor, mi 1987), 23, 28-30; W. Schüler, Das 
Herzogtum Nassau 1806-1866: Deutsche Geschichte 
im Kleinformat (Wiesbaden 2006), 3; B.C.D. 
Anderson, ‘State-Building and Bureaucracy 
in Early-Nineteenth-Century Nassau,’ Central 
European History 24:3 (1991) 223-225.
24 E. Treichel, Der Primat der Bürokratie: Bürokratischer 
Staat und bürokratische Elite im Herzogtum Nassau, 
1806-1866 (Stuttgart 1991) 37-45; H.P.H. Jansen, ‘De 
Bredase Nassaus’, in: C.A. Tamse (ed.), Nassau en 
Oranje in de Nederlandse Geschiedenis (Alphen a/d 
Rijn 1979) 13-44; B. Woelderink, ‘Oranje tussen 
Nassau en Nederland, 1795-1802’, in: Jaarboek 
Oranje-Nassau Museum (1996), 93; Struik, Oranje in 
Ballingschap, 77.
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to military intervention if the House of Orange was again threatened.25 
As Princes of Nassau, Orange was also tied to the Reich and the Habsburg 
Monarchy, but due to tensions arising from Habsburg possession of the 
Southern Low Countries, the relations never became as important as relations 
with Britain and Prussia.26
The relationship between the various branches of the House of Nassau 
was generally good. The Princes of Orange were always sent on a tour of 
Nassau and the surrounding states to meet local rulers and notables, and the 
Princesses of Orange frequently married into the other branches. But with the 
signing of the ‘Nassauischer Erbverein’, the Union of Inheritance of 1783, the 
intra-dynastic ties took on a new meaning. The act guaranteed that the Nassau 
lands remained an undivided entity and that alienation of Nassau lands 
was forbidden. Moreover, it established a clear line of succession within the 
dynasty.27 The Prince of Orange-Nassau-Dietz, who was already de facto primus 
inter pares became President of the House of Nassau. But the act was not merely 
aimed at pre-empting potential intra-dynastic disputes over succession 
and territory.28 It was also a commitment to collaborate in international 
politics. In the multipolar international order of the 1780s, this dynastic 
alliance makes much sense. As small geopolitical actors, the Netherlands and 
the Nassaus risked being dominated by the larger international powers. By 
allying into a dynastic network there was a greater chance of cancelling out 
these risks. Moreover, for small geopolitical actors, it was challenging and 
expensive to maintain relations with all key international powers. Conducting 
international politics through dynastic networks allowed for one component 
part of the dynasty to focus on maintaining ties with one or two actors, whilst 
the other actors remained accessible through its partners. Ideally, a dynastic 
network would have members with ties to all key actors. The House of Nassau, 
in which Orange had strong ties with Britain and Prussia and the Walramians 
had strong ties to the Habsburgs and the Reich, closely approached this ideal.
25 ‘Traité d’Alliance défensive entra le Roi de la 
Grand-Brétagne et L.H.P. les Etats-Généraux 
D.P.U., 23 April 1788’, in: G.F. de Martens (ed.), 
Recueil de Traits d’Alliance […] (Gottingen 1818) iv: 
372-377; ‘Traité d’Alliance défensive entra le Roi de 
Prusse et L.H.P. les Etats-Généraux D.P.U., Berlin. 
15 April 1788’, Martens, Recueil de Traits, iv: 377-
382; ‘Traité provisionel d’alliance défesive entre 
le Roi de Prusse et le Roi de la Grenade-Brétagne. 
Loo, 13 Juin 1788’, ibidem, iv: 382-385.
26 P. Schroeder, The Transformation of European 
Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford 1994) 31-32; K. Vetter, 
‘Oranien-Nassau und die Hohenzollern im 17./18. 
Jahrhundert’, in: H. Lademacher (ed.), Oranien-
Nassau, die Niederlande und das Reich (Münster 
1995) 98.
27 ‘Kirberger Conferenz Protocoll, 7-24 January 1783’, 
Netherlands, Koninklijk Huisarchief [hereafter 
nl-kha], b6, 38i.
28 B. Woelderink, ‘De erfprins in Nassau in 1789. 
Het bezoek van prins Willem Frederik aan de 
Nassause erflanden als onderdeel van zijn Duitse 
studietijd,’ Jaarboek Oranje-Nassau Museum 
(1994) 7-24; Struik, Oranje in Ballingschap, 17, 77; 
Anderson, ‘State-Building’, 223-224; Anderson, 
Bieberstein, 23-28.
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A German Dynasty?
The ascendancy of France on the eve of the nineteenth century posed a grave 
challenge to the House of Nassau, though particularly to Orange. In 1795, 
French armies conquered the Netherlands and forced the House of Orange 
to flee. In exile, the House of Orange hoped to invoke the 1788 treaty, and 
compel Britain and Prussia to intervene to restore them to the Netherlands. 
For Prussia, however, the dangers of a continued conflict with France weighed 
heavier on the balance of foreign policy than did their commitments to 
Orange. On 5 April 1795 Prussia concluded a peace with France that forced 
her to withdraw from the First Coalition and recognise French occupation of 
the left bank of the Rhine. This treaty was a severe blow to Orange’s hopes of 
being restored to the Netherlands, but it was not a complete abandonment 
of the House of Orange. Prussia had not yet officially recognised the new 
regime in the Netherlands and therefore suitable compensation for Orange 
could still be negotiated. Moreover, the Franco-Prussian peace guaranteed 
that Nassau-Dietz remained safely inside a neutral zone separating the 
French influence sphere from the Prussian one.29 Britain remained at war 
with France, but undertook no direct action in support of Orange until the 
aforementioned invasion of 1799. Its failure caused a rift in Anglo-Orange 
relations, but the definitive break did not come until 1 October 1801, when 
Britain and France signed the preliminary articles of peace in London. This 
prompted the Stadtholder to leave Britain to settle in Dietz in November 
1801.30 The Habsburg Monarchy was the most determined adversary of 
France, and briefly the Stadtholder, in his capacity of President of the House of 
Nassau, pinned his hopes of restoration to the Netherlands on the Habsburgs. 
However, periodic Habsburg defeats soon dashed Orange hopes. The Peace 
of Campo Formio, of 17 October 1797, ended the War of the First Coalition 
and confirmed French possession of the left bank of the Rhine. Article 20 of 
the Treaty of Campo Formio stipulated that those sovereigns who had lost 
territory on the left bank of the Rhine would be compensated with territory 
elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire, and that a congress would be held 
at Rastatt to hammer out these issues. The resumption of war between 
the Habsburgs and France in 1798 proved only temporary. On 9 February 
1801, the Habsburgs and France signed the Peace of Lunéville, once again 
29 ‘Réflexions du 3 d’Août 1795’, Colenbrander, 
Gedenkstukken, ii: 851-855; ‘Der Sonderfrieden 
von Basel, 5. April 1795’, in: U. Hufeld (ed.), Der 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluß von 1803: Eine 
Dokumentation zum Untergang des Alten Reiches. 
(Köln 2003) 37-39; Anderson, Bieberstein, 49; 
Struik, Oranje in Ballingschap, 80-81; M. Bernath, 
‘Die auswärtige Politik Nassaus 1805-1812. Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte des Rheinbundes und 
der politischen Ideen am Mittelrhein zur Zeit 
Napoleons,’ Nassauische Annalen (1952) 108.
30 Koch, Willem i, 88-118; Struik, Oranje in 
Ballingschap, 164-166.
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confirming French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, and the need to 
compensate displaced sovereigns.31
With the arrival of a general European cessation of hostilities the 
process of territorial reorganisation of Europe could begin. The House 
of Orange was in a difficult position. The Rastatter Congress dealt only 
with compensation claims of sovereigns who had lost territory within the 
Holy Roman Empire, and the territorial losses of the House of Orange in 
the Netherlands lay outside the Holy Roman Empire. But the Stadtholder 
circumvented this legality by reverting to his role as President of the House 
of Nassau and dispatching a single delegation to pursue the interests of 
the entire house, including Orange’s interests in the Netherlands. The ploy 
paid off. In return for renouncing all claims to the Netherlands, per treaty 
of Amiens, Orange was offered compensation consisting of the enlargement 
of Orange’s Nassau territory with the bishopric of Fulda, Dortmund, several 
abbeys, Corvey, Weingarten, the towns of Isny and Buchhorn, as well as several 
other small tracts of land. The territory comprised about 120,000 inhabitants, 
and in terms of revenue it was about a quarter of what the Stadtholder had 
received in the Netherlands.32 
This offer caused a schism within the House of Orange. Stadtholder 
William v refused to accept secularised territory out of principle, but the 
Prince of Orange was not burdened by such moralities. He feared that if his 
father persisted in his refusal to accept compensation, Orange would be left 
empty-handed.33 After much debate a compromise was reached whereby 
William v remained ruler of Nassau-Dietz, but abdicated as Stadtholder of 
the Netherlands in favour of his son. The Prince of Orange, now formally 
Stadtholder William vi, could then decide to accept the French offer. As 
expected, William vi took up the offer and thus became Prince of Fulda. 
Henceforth, there were two Princes of Orange: William v of Orange-
Nassau-Dietz, and William vi of Orange-Nassau-Fulda.34 A more important 
consequence was that the links between Orange and the Netherlands were 
severed, and Orange became an exclusively German dynasty. The Walramian 
Nassaus has lost some territory around Saarbrücken and could thus claim 
compensation at Rastatt, but the opportunity for connecting the fragmented 
Nassau lands was lost, as most of the territory was awarded to Hesse-Darmstadt. 
31 ‘Der Sonderfrieden von Campo 
Formio, 17 October 1797’, Hufeld, 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluß, 54-56; ‘Der Frieden 
von Lunéville, 9 February 1801’, ibidem, 57-64.
32 Koch, Willem i, 119-134; Struik, Oranje in 
Ballingschap, 108-120, 138-182; J.A. Bornewasser, 
‘Koning Willem i,’ in: Tamse (ed.), Nassau en 
Oranje, 236; Woelderink, ‘Oranje tussen Nassau 
en Nederland’, 98-108.
33 ‘William v to Prince of Orange, 12 June 1801-18 
September 1801’, Naber, Correspondentie, iv: 44-
46; ‘William v to Prince of Orange, 29 May 1802’, 
Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken, vi: 703-706.
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However, the translocation of Orange to Nassau did contribute to the 
consolidation of the territory of the House.35
Confrontation and isolation
William vi was not wholly satisfied with the compensation he received for 
the family losses in the Netherlands, and he set out on a quest for additional 
compensation that would have dire consequences for the House of Orange. 
The Prince had taken the liberty to interpret the compensation that he had 
accepted as the result of a deal between himself and France only, and he 
reserved the right to obtain additional compensation from the new Dutch 
regime. In 1804, together with the arch-schemer Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, 
the Prince secured another 5 million guilders of compensation. However, 
when Napoleon got word of this impending transaction, he intervened to 
appropriate the money for his war effort. The Prince was furious and, in his 
reaction, he dragged along his father. In September 1804 Napoleon held an 
audience for the lesser German princes in Mainz. Both Princes of Orange 
were invited, but both refused to attend.36 Napoleon responded by occupying 
Nassau-Dietz in anticipation of the outbreak of war with Prussia, forcing 
William v to flee to Brunswick, where he died on 9 April 1806. Formally, 
Nassau-Dietz now passed to William vi, but de facto Dietz was under French 
control.37
The Nassau lands of the House of Orange subsequently became 
bargaining chips in Napoleon’s efforts to reorganise Central Europe. 
Habsburg’s defeat in the War of the Third Coalition presented Napoleon 
with the opportunity to disband the Holy Roman Empire. On 12 July 1806, 
Napoleon prompted sixteen German states to sign the Confederation of 
the Rhine Act, with which the signatories organised themselves into the 
Confederation of the Rhine under protection of the French Emperor. The 
House of Nassau was one of the original signatories, but the Nassau delegate 
represented only Nassau-Weilburg and Nassau-Usingen.38 The Walramians 
were greatly rewarded for joining the Confederation. Usingen and Weilburg 
35 U. Ziegler (ed.), Quellen zu den Reformen in den 
Rheinbundstaaten. Volume 5: Regierungakten des 
Herzogtums Nassau, 1803-1814 (München 2001) 
6-10; Anderson, Bieberstein, 61-100; Treichel, 
Primat der Bürokratie, 46-50. The Walramians 
were content with the result: ‘Frederick William 
of Weilburg to Prince of Orange, Weilburg, 14 
February 1803’, nl-kha, A32, 102.
36 Struik, Oranje in ballingschap, 208-210, 220-225.
37 French troop movements: ‘De Heerdt d’Eversberg 
to William v, 10 March 1806’, nl-kha, a35, xiv14; 
‘Charles de Dalwijk to William v, 12 March 1806’, 
nl-kha, a35, xiv14; Hallema, Oranjevorsten, 148.
38 ‘Convention relative à la Confédération du 
Rhin […]’, in: Collection des Actes, Reglemens, 
Ordonnances et Autres Pièces Officielles Relatives a 
la Confédération du Rhin (Paris 1808), i: 11-22.
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were united into a single duchy, and Frederick William of Nassau-Weilburg 
was elevated to Prince of Nassau. His cousin, Prince Frederick Augustus of 
Nassau-Usingen, remained Duke of Nassau. In 1816, the Walramian branches 
were united, when both Frederick William and Frederick Augustus died 
in quick succession. Frederick William’s son, William, became sole ruler of 
the Walramian Nassaus. Territorially, the Walramians also benefitted from 
joining the Confederation of the Rhine. The lands of three princes, three 
imperial counts and eight imperial knights were added to the united Duchy of 
Nassau.39
For the House of Orange, the creation of the Confederation of the 
Rhine meant disaster. Nassau-Dietz was divided up. The county of Dietz 
and its surroundings were allocated to the Duchy of Nassau. The remaining 
territories, Dillenburg, Hadamar, and Siegen, were incorporated into the 
Duchy of Berg. The territorial integrity of Fulda also seemed to crumble 
as Napoleon stripped off tracts of territory to hand out to his dependants. 
The abbey of Weingarten and the town of Isny, for instance, were awarded 
to the King of Württemberg.40 Napoleon did inform the Prince of Orange 
that he would be allowed to retain the remainder of Fulda if he joined 
the Confederation of the Rhine, but if the Prince refused, Fulda would be 
incorporated into Hessen. For the Prince, however, things had gone too far 
already, and rather than join the Confederation of the Rhine, he entered 
the Prussian army. In hindsight, this was an unfortunate decision. The 
Prince commanded a Prussian division in the War of the Fourth Coalition, 
but was captured at Erfurt on 16 October 1806.41 Napoleon now seized 
the principality of Fulda, which was later awarded to the new state of 
Westphalia.42 Affairs continued to go downhill for Orange thereafter. Initially 
the Prince of Orange hoped to receive compensation for the loss of Fulda, and 
he made three desperate attempts to re-establish relations with Napoleon, 
but Napoleon held Orange responsible for their misfortune and dismissed the 
overtures. Defeated and resigned, Orange retired to the Niederländische Palais 
in Berlin.43 The outbreak of the War of the Fifth Coalition offered The Prince 
of Orange a new opportunity to regain his losses. He entered Habsburg service 
39 ‘Proklamation zur Errichtung des Herzogtums 
1806’, Schüler, Herzogtum Nassau, 306-307. 
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152-191; Bernath, ‘Die auswärtige Politik Nassaus’, 
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Orange, 22 July 1806’, nl-kha, a35, xiv15. See also 
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1806’, Naber, Correspondentie, iv: 244-245; in: 
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i, 167-172; Struik, Oranje in ballingschap, 245-263.
42 Ibidem, 269-288.
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538, 540, v: 761-762, 764-767.
article – artikel
as a Major-General, but he was wounded at Wagram and forced to retire from 
active service.44 The Prince now retreated to his private estates in Silesia.45
Oranje Boven!
It was at this low ebb in the fortunes of the House of Orange that Tsar 
Alexander passed by the Orange estates, allowing the Prince to offer his 
services to the Tsar. The Tsar’s accepting Orange into the alliance might 
seem puzzling, because, superficially, the House of Orange had nothing to 
contribute to the anti-Napoleonic war effort. But the Prince of Orange had 
several things going for him. To start, he had luck. The Prince caught the Tsar 
at a time when, after a long and exhausting military campaign in Russia, he 
was in dire need of allies, both to continue the war and to assert his position 
as leader of the soon-to-be Sixth Coalition. And so one may expect the Tsar 
to have been receptive to offers of alliance, in particular if it came from a 
House that had opposed Napoleon uninterrupted since 1804. But Orange 
had more to offer. To start, since Napoleon’s intervention had collapsed the 
compensation deal with the Dutch regime, the House of Orange retained an 
outstanding claim to the Netherlands. This could be utilised to reinforce the 
allied legitimacy of challenging Napoleon. More importantly, despite their 
expulsion from their dynastic territories, Orange remained the President of 
the House of Nassau, which meant that the Prince of Orange could be useful 
in restoring allied influence with the broader dynastic network. Of course, in 
March 1813, Orange’s contribution to the anti-Napoleonic alliance was very 
much hypothetical. It remained to be seen whether the Prince could live up to 
the role he assigned for himself. But in the months to come, Orange showed 
himself up to the task.
A first thing he did was to use his position as member of the alliance 
to organise a military force. After the Dutch Republic came into French orbit 
in 1795, Dutch soldiers had participated in French military campaigns, 
including Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812. The historiography has it 
that the Dutch contingent of the Grande Armée was lost in Russia. This is 
true, but it does not mean that all Dutch troops perished in Russia, but rather 
that the Dutch contingent ceased to function as a coherent fighting force. 
A good many Dutch soldiers were captured by the allies, or deserted and were 
rounded up. These were given the opportunity of taking service in the allied 
armies, which many did.46 The Prince of Orange gathered these seasoned 
44 Schoenmaker and Schulten, Oranje op de Bres, 40.
45 J.A. van Hamel, ‘ ‘s Erfprinsen toevluchtsoord. 
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46 ‘Wilhelmina to Constant Rebecque, 2 December 
1813’, nl-na, 2.21.008.01, 34; ‘Louise to Prince of 
Orange, 10 March 1813’, Naber, Correspondentie, 
v: 187; G. Venzky, Die russisch-deutsche Legion in 
den Jahren 1811-1815 (Wiesbaden 1966), 86; J.W.A. 
ru
ssia, britain
 an
d
 th
e h
o
u
se o
f o
ran
g
e
17
hay
Dutch troops and organised them into a military force, the Dutch Legion of 
Orange.47
A second thing Orange did was to reinforce his position as President 
of the House of Nassau.48 This was relatively easy because the ties with the 
Walramian Nassaus were never severed.49 Besides, in the light of unfolding 
events in Central Europe, the Walramians recognised the benefits of 
establishing relations with the allies. So, rather than Orange taking charge of 
Nassau affairs, the re-establishing of relations between Orange and Nassau 
may be characterised as a restoration of Nassau’s dynastic politics of the late 
eighteenth century, which benefitted all those involved.
As President of the House of Nassau, the Prince of Orange gained 
command over Nassau’s troops, which he intended to use in the struggle 
against France. The problem was, however, that, as a member of the 
Confederation of the Rhine, Nassau had been forced to place its troops at the 
disposal of France. In early 1813, Nassau’s troops were serving in the Iberian 
Peninsula.50 But rather than resign themselves to the seemingly inevitable 
loss of their army, the Prince of Orange and his Walramian cousins designed 
a ploy to retrieve their troops from the Peninsula. The Walramians would 
instruct their troops to defect to the British army under Wellington.51 To 
avoid the risk of the troops being imprisoned or employed in the British army, 
the Prince of Orange, who by this time had arrived in London, would notify 
the British government that his troops were willing to defect to Wellington, 
and request for their transportation to the frontline in Germany.52 Bathurst, 
the British secretary of state for war and the colonies, was keen to assist in the 
repatriating of the Dutch contingent of the Napoleonic army in the Peninsula, 
and he drew up instructions for Wellington to assist in the defection. The 
Prince of Orange was then presented with these instructions and signed off 
on them.53 It was only a few days later that the Prince felt the need to rectify 
a misunderstanding that hitherto had gone supposedly unnoticed to him: he 
had not requested for Dutch troops to be repatriated, but for Nassau troops, 
Naber, Prinses Wilhelmina, gemalin van Willem v, 
Prins van Oranje (Amsterdam 1908), 280-281.
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of which he had only recently gained command.54 By now, of course, the 
instructions to Wellington had already been sent off and the wheels for the 
transfer of the Nassau troops had been set in motion.55 The Nassau troops 
were to arrive at Plymouth on 12 January 1814, but before their arrival, 
Orange redirected their destination to the Netherlands to join his forces.56
So, the Prince of Orange’s joining the alliance in March 1813 brought 
the allies the tangible benefit of adding troops to the allied ranks. Of course, 
the military contribution of these troops must not be overstated. The Dutch 
Legion of Orange only re-entered the fighting gradually and the Nassau 
troops only joined the fighting in early 1814. But even if Orange’s troops 
were not at the forefront of the fight, Dutch troops did battle their way back 
from Russia, though Central Europe, to the Low Countries, where, together 
with the Nassau troops, they helped drive out the French. Furthermore, 
Orange’s troops constituted the nucleus of the new armed forces of the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands that participated in defeating Napoleon at 
Waterloo.57 Additionally, Orange’s restoration as the President of the House 
of Nassau considerably facilitated Nassau’s defection to the allies on 23 
November 1813, thereby weakening Napoleon’s grip on Central Europe.58 
In sum, one could conclude that, whilst the Prince of Orange may not have 
played a major role in the defeat of Napoleon, he certainly played a role 
commensurate to his status as minor prince.
The House of Nassau also benefitted from the Prince of Orange joining 
the alliance at an early stage. The connection with Orange facilitated a difficult 
defection and it saved Nassau from a considerable burden. In their aim to 
defeat Napoleon, the allies demanded that all defectors contribute manpower 
to the war effort.59 This was a considerable strain for many states because, like 
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Nassau, their troops were integrated into the Napoleonic armed forces, which 
meant that they would have to recruit new units. But because Nassau and 
Orange had arranged the defection of Nassau’s troops to Wellington, which 
were employed in the Low Countries, Nassau could claim to have fulfilled its 
military obligations already.60
Not least was the joining of the anti-Napoleonic alliance in March 
1813 of benefit to Orange and their aim to return to the Netherlands. Orange 
was the second power, only after Prussia, to join the alliance that would 
become the Sixth Coalition. This is important because all other powers that 
joined the alliance thereafter, such as Sweden, the Habsburg Monarchy, 
Britain and the lesser powers were forced to accept the alliance’s acquis 
communautaire regarding Orange, that is: support for the return of the House 
of Orange to a liberated Netherlands. Sweden was quick to endorse the 
acquis communautaire, and neither the Habsburgs nor the lesser powers raised 
objections.61 Britain was a different matter. Britain had vested interests in 
the Low Countries, and it could not rely on a sovereign whom they hardly 
knew and whose previous conduct had given rise to suspicion, to take British 
interests into account. But the fact that the Prince of Orange arrived in 
London in March 1813, not as an isolated and stateless prince, but as head of 
a House that was a member of the anti-Napoleonic coalition with a stake in 
the fight, presented the British government with an fait accompli that could be 
challenged only at considerable diplomatic cost. Therefore, the British chose 
for the next best option, which was to keep the Prince in London to discover 
his politics and the extent to which he would accept British interests.62 So 
rather than that the British government actively supported the return of the 
House of Orange to the Netherlands from an early date, Britain was in fact the 
last major power to endorse the restoration of the House of Orange, and it did 
so only after affairs in the Netherlands had progressed beyond the point of 
return. Being a member of the anti-Napoleonic coalition benefitted Orange in 
another way too. Orange’s participation in the military campaign to liberate 
the Netherlands offered the Dutch the opportunity to portray themselves 
as liberators rather than as liberated. Orange’s participation in the military 
campaign to defeat Napoleon furthermore allowed the Dutch to present 
themselves as victors in the Napoleonic Wars. This was valuable political 
capital, in the era of the reconstruction of the post-Napoleonic international 
order. The clearest sign of the success of the agency of the House of Orange is 
perhaps that no ‘Dutch Question’ arose at the Congress of Vienna. This was 
because Dutch affairs had been settled already.
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Conclusion
This article explores the re-establishment of the Orange dynasty in the 
Netherlands in 1813. The Dutch historiography presents the return of the 
House of Orange to the Netherlands as a logical outcome of the uprising 
in the Netherlands, and Britain, due to her strategic interests in the Low 
Countries and her traditional support for Orange, is attributed a prominent 
role in facilitating the restoration of the House of Orange. Whilst the current 
historiographical representation is not incorrect, it largely ignores the 
historical agency of the House of Orange. Rather than view the historical 
experience of the House of Orange through the prism of the geopolitical actor 
that was the Netherlands, this article argues that the agency of the House 
of Orange should be understood in the context of the agency of the wider 
dynastic network of the House of Nassau.
In 1783 the House of Nassau concluded a dynastic alliance that 
committed the various branches to collaborate in international politics. In 
the multipolar international order of the late eighteenth century this made 
sense, but within a decade after the alliance was signed, France started its 
ascendancy that would lead to the creation of a Napoleonic international 
order, dominated by France. The changing of the international order, 
from a multipolar order to a unipolar order, significantly undermined the 
effectiveness of the dynastic alliance of Nassau, forcing the component 
parts of the dynasty to scramble for a policy for dealing with France. The 
Walramians followed the path of states of Central Europe, which was the 
path of acceptance of French supremacy and collaboration.63 This policy paid 
off. The united Duchy of Nassau grew in territory, population, and status. 
Orange’s loss of their seat of power in the Netherlands got Franco-Orange 
relations off to a bad start. The subsequent inability to accept his losses led the 
Prince of Orange, often rash, to seize any opportunity to challenge Napoleon. 
The Prince’s confrontational politics cost him dearly. Orange was stripped of 
its territories and marginalised to the fringes of civilised Europe.
But the dynastic relations of the House of Nassau were never fully 
severed. When Napoleon’s unsuccessful Russian campaign allowed for the 
great powers to reclaim a position of importance in the European order, 
multipolarity returned to international relations. And with the return of 
multipolarity, dynastic networking once again became a viable means for 
pursuing foreign policy aims for the House of Nassau. In March 1813, at 
Breslau, the Prince of Orange and President of the House of Nassau, was quick 
to seize the moment to join a budding alliance of Russia and Prussia. This 
affair is too often ignored. In fact, it was a turning point in the history of the 
House of Nassau and the House of Orange, and by extension the history of the 
63 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 
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Netherlands. Joining the alliance offered all branches of the House of Nassau 
a timely opportunity to switch allegiances in a conflict that was changing the 
face of Europe. And by offering the Prince of Orange the opportunity to play 
a role befitting his station in the campaign to defeat Napoleon, the alliance 
was the perfect vehicle for returning the House of Orange to an independent, 
liberated Netherlands. The uprising in the Netherlands in November 1813 
only served to nudge a reluctant Britain into endorsing what had already been 
set in motion, the restoration of the Orange dynasty.
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